Abstract. Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) is a useful cryptographic tool in encrypted cloud storage. However, it has been reported that DSSE usually suffers from file-injection attacks and content leak of deleted documents. To mitigate these attacks, forward privacy and backward privacy have been proposed. Nevertheless, the existing forward/backward-private DSSE schemes can only support single keyword queries. To address this problem, in this paper, we propose two DSSE schemes supporting range queries. One is forward-private and supports a large number of documents. The other can achieve backward privacy, while it can only support a limited number of documents. Finally, we also give the security proofs of the proposed DSSE schemes in the random oracle model.
Introduction
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) is a useful cryptographic primitive that can encrypt the data to protect its confidentiality while keeping its searchability. Dynamic SSE (DSSE) further provides data dynamics that allows the client to update data over the time without losing data confidentiality and searchability. Due to this property, DSSE is highly demanded in encrypted cloud. However, many existing DSSE schemes [14, 8] suffer from file-injection attacks [7, 22] , where the adversary can compromise the privacy of a client query by injecting a small portion of new documents to the encrypted database. To resist this attack, Zhang et al. [22] highlighted the need of forward privacy that was informally introduced by Stefanov et al. [19] . The formal definition of forward privacy for DSSE was given by Bost [5] who also proposed a concrete forward-private DSSE scheme. Furthermore, Bost et al. [6] demonstrated the damage of content leak of deleted documents and proposed the corresponding security notionbackward privacy. Several backward-private DSSE schemes were also presented in [6] .
Nevertheless, the existing forward/backward-private DSSE schemes only support single keyword queries, which are not expressive enough in data search service [13, 12] . To solve this problem, we aim to design forward/backward-private DSSE schemes supporting range queries. Our design starts from the regular binary tree in [13] to support range queries. However, the binary tree in [13] cannot be applied directly to the dynamic setting. It is mainly because that the keywords in [13] are labelled according to the corresponding tree levels that will change significantly in the dynamic setting. A naïve solution is to replace all old keywords by the associated new keywords. This is, however, not efficient. To address this problem, we have to explore new approaches for our goal. Our Contributions. To achieve the above goal, we propose two new DSSE constructions supporting range queries in this paper. The first one is forwardprivate but with a larger client overhead in contrast to [13] . The second one is backward-private DSSE which greatly reduces the client and the server storage at the cost of losing forward privacy. In more details, our main contributions are as follows:
-To make the binary tree suitable for range queries in the dynamic setting, we introduce a new binary tree data structure, and then present the first forward-private DSSE supporting range queries by applying it to Bost's scheme [5] . However, the forward privacy is achieved at the expense of suffering from a large storage overhead on the client side. -To achieve backward privacy, we apply the Paillier cryptosystem and the bit string representation to Bost's framework. To reduce the storage at both the client and server side, we used a fixed update token for each keyword. Note that, this scheme is not forward-private, since, for every update, the server knows which keyword has been updated. We refer readers to Section 4 for more details. Notably, due to the limitation of the Paillier cryptosystem, it cannot support large-scale database consisting a large number of documents. Nevertheless, it suits well for certain scenarios where the number of documents is moderate. The new approach may give new lights on designing more efficient and secure DSSE schemes. -Also, the comparison with related works in Table 1 and detailed security analyses are provided, which demonstrate that our constructions are not only forward/backward-private but also with a comparable efficiency.
Remark:
In this full version, we correct the wrong theorem (cf. Theorem 2) in the conference version [24] , where we claimed that the second construction can achieve forward privacy. In fact, the forward privacy cannot be achieved, because the update can be linked to previous searches by the fixed token. In particular, we focus on achieving backward privacy by applying the Paillier cryptosystem and the bit string representation to Bost [5] 's framework, which can also achieve forward privacy due to Bost's technique. For every update on keyword n, however, the server needs to store a ciphertext (of Paillier encryption) corresponding to n. In addition, the number of keywords is nearly doubled compared to the scheme of [5] , as mentioned in our first construction. Then this construction incurs large storage on both the server and the client side. In the conference version, we used a fixed update token for each keyword to further reduce the storage overhead. By this way, the server can homomorphicly add the ciphertext to the previous ones corresponding to the same keyword, and the client does not need to store the current search token yet. Therefore, both the client and the server storage are reduced a lot, but at the cost of losing forward privacy. Nevertheless, we made some mistake when preparing the conference version and so we correct it here. [13] wR
small W is the number of keywords in a database, wR is the number of keywords for a range query(we map a range query to a few different keywords).
Related Works
Song et al. [18] were the first using symmetric encryption to facilitate keyword search over the encrypted data. Later, Curtmola et al. [11] gave a formal definition for SSE and the corresponding security model in the static setting. To make SSE more scalable and expressive, Cash et al. [9] proposed a new scalable SSE supporting Boolean queries. Following this construction, many extensions have been proposed. Faber et al. [13] extended it to process a much richer collection of queries. For instance, they used a binary tree with keywords labelled according to the tree levels to support range queries. Zuo et al. [23] made another extension to support general Boolean queries. Cash et al.'s construction has also been extended into multi-user setting [20, 15, 21] . However, the above schemes cannot support data update. To solve this problem, some DSSE schemes have been proposed [14, 8] .
However, designing a secure DSSE scheme is not an easy job. Cash et al. [7] pointed out that only a small leakage leveraged by the adversary would be enough to compromise the privacy of clients' queries. A concrete attack named file-injection attack was proposed by Zhang et al. [22] . In this attack, the adversary can infer the concept of aclient queries by injecting a small portion of new documents into encrypted database. This attack also highlights the need for forward privacy which protects security of new added parts. Accordingly, we have backward privacy that protects security of new added parts and later deleted. These two security notions were first introduced by Stefanov et al. [19] . The formal definitions of forward/backward privacy for DSSE were given by Bost [5] and Bost et al. [6] , respectively. In [5] , Bost also proposed a concrete forward-private DSSE scheme, it does not support physical deletion. Later on, Kim et al. [16] proposed a forward-private DSSE scheme supporting physical deletion. Meanwhile, Bost et al. [6] proposed a forward/backward-private DSSE to reduce leakage during deletion. Unfortunately, all the existing forward/backward-private DSSE schemes only support single keyword queries. Hence, forward/backward-private DSSE supporting more expressive queries, such as range queries, are quite desired.
Apart from the binary tree technique, order preserving encryption (OPE) can also be used to support range queries. The concept of OPE was proposed by Agrawal et al. [1] , and it allows the order of the plaintexts to be preserved in the ciphertexts. It is easy to see that this kind of encryption would lead to the leakage in [2, 3] . To reduce this leakage, Boneh et al. [4] proposed another concept named order revealing encryption (ORE), where the order of the ciphertexts are revealed by using an algorithm rather than comparing the ciphertexts (in OPE) directly. More efficient ORE schemes were proposed later [10] . However, OREbased SSE still leaks much information about the underlying plaintexts. To avoid this, in this paper, we focus on how to use the binary tree structure to achieve range queries.
Organization
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we give the background information and building blocks that are used in this paper. In Sect. 3, we give the definition of DSSE and its security definition. After that in Sect. 4, we present a new binary tree and our DSSE schemes. Their security analyses are given in Sect. 5. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes this work.
Preliminaries
In this section, we describe cryptographic primitives (building blocks) that are used in this work.
Trapdoor Permutations
A trapdoor permutation (TDP) Π is a one-way permutation over a domain D such that (1) it is "easy" to compute Π for any value of the domain with the public key, and (2) it is "easy" to calculate the inverse Π −1 for any value of a co-domain M only if a matching secret key is known. More formally, Π consists of the following algorithms:
For a security parameter 1 λ , the algorithm returns a pair of cryptographic keys: a public key TPK and a secret key TSK.
-Π(TPK, x) → y: For a pair: public key TPK and x ∈ D, the algorithm outputs y ∈ M. -Π −1 (TSK, y) → x: For a pair: a secret key TSK and y ∈ M, the algorithm returns x ∈ D.
One-wayness. We say Π is one-way if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, an advantage
is negligible, where (TSK,
Paillier Cryptosystem
A Paillier cryptosystem Σ = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is defined by following three algorithms:
It chooses at random two primes p and q of similar lengths and computes n = pq and φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1). Next it sets g = n+1, β = φ(n) and µ = φ(n) −1 mod n. It returns PK = (n, g) and SK = (β, µ). -Enc(PK, m) → c: Let m be the message, where 0 ≤ m < n, the algorithm selects an integer r at random from Z n and computes a ciphertext c = g m ·r
Semantically Security. We say Σ is semantically secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, an advantage
In our second construction, we need this property to achieve backward privacy.
Notations
The list of notations used is given in Table 2 . W The number of keywords in a database DB BDB The binary database which is constructed from a database DB by using our binary tree BT m The number of values in the range [0, m − 1] for our range queries v A value in the range [0, m − 1] where 0 ≤ v < m ni The i-th node in our binary tree which is considered as the keyword rooto The root node of the binary tree before update rootn The root node of the binary tree after update STc The current search token for a node n M A random value for ST0 which is the first search token for a node n U Tc The current update token for a node n T A map which is used to store the encrypted database EDB N A map which is used to store the current search token for ni NSet The node set which contains the nodes TPK The public key of trapdoor permutation TSK The secret key of trapdoor permutation PK The public key of Paillier cryptosystem SK The secret key of Paillier cryptosystem fi The i-th file PBT Perfect binary tree CBT Complete binary tree VBT Virtual perfect binary tree ABT Assigned complete binary tree
Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE)
We follow the database model given in the paper [5] . A database is a collection of (index, keyword set) pairs denoted as
, where ind i ∈ {0, 1} and W i ⊆ {0, 1}
* . The set of all keywords of the database DB is
, where d is the number of documents in DB. We identify W = |W| as the total number of keywords and N = Σ d i=1 |W i | as the number of document/keyword pairs. We denote DB(w) as the set of documents that contain a keyword w. To achieve a sublinear search time, we encrypt the file indices of DB(w) corresponding to the same keyword w (a.k.a. inverted index 5 ). A DSSE scheme Γ consists of an algorithm Setup and two protocols Search and Update as described below.
For a security parameter 1 λ and a database DB. The algorithm outputs an encrypted database EDB for the server and a secret state σ for the client.
The protocol is executed between a client (with her query q and state σ) and a server (with its EDB). At the end of the protocol, the client outputs a set of file indices I and the server outputs nothing.
The protocol runs between a client and a server. The client input is a state σ, an operation op = (add, del) she wants to perform and a collection of in = (ind, w) pairs that are going to be modified, where add, del mean the addition and deletion of a document/keyword pair, respectively, ind is the file index and w is a set of keywords. The server input is EDB. Update returns an updated state σ to the client and an updated encrypted database EDB to the server.
Security Definition
The security definition of DSSE is formulated using the following two games:
is simulated using the leakage of DSSE. The leak-
, which describes what information is leaked to the adversary A. If the adversary A cannot distinguish these two games, then we can say there is no other information leaked except the information that can be inferred from the leakage function L. More formally,
On input a database DB, which is chosen by the adversary A, it outputs EDB by using Setup(1 λ , DB) to the adversary A. A can repeatedly perform a search query q (or an update query (op, in)). The game outputs the results generated by running Search(q) (or Update(op, in)) to the adversary A. Eventually, A outputs a bit.
On input a database DB which is chosen by the adversary A, it outputs EDB to the adversary A by using a simulator S(L Stp (1 λ , DB)). Then, it simulates the results for the search query q by using the leakage function S(L Srch (q)) and uses S(L U pdt (op, in)) to simulate the results for update query (op, in). Eventually, A outputs a bit. Definition 1. A DSSE scheme Γ is L-adaptively-secure if for every PPT adversary A, there exists an efficient simulator S such that
Constructions
In this section, we give two DSSE constructions. In order to process range queries, we deploy a new binary tree which is modified from the binary tree in [13] . Now, we first give our binary tree used in our constructions.
Binary Tree for Range Queries
In a binary tree BT, every node has at most two children named lef t and right.
If a node has a child, then there is an edge that connects these two nodes. The node is the parent parent of its child. The root root of a binary tree does not have parent and the leaf of a binary tree does not have any child. In this paper, the binary tree is stored in thew form of linked structures. The first node of BT is the root of a binary tree. For example, the root node of the binary tree BT is BT, the left child of BT is BT.lef t, and the parent of BT's left child is BT.lef t.parent, where BT = BT.lef t.parent. In a complete binary tree CBT, every level, except possibly the last, is completely filled, and all nodes in the last level are as far left as possible (the leaf level may not full). A perfect binary tree PBT is a binary tree in which all internal nodes (not the leaves) have two children and all leaves have the same depth or same level. Note that, PBT is a special CBT.
Binary Database
In this paper, we use binary database BDB which is generated from DB. In DB, keywords (the first row in 1.(c)) are used to retrieve the file indices (every column in 1.(c)). For simplicity, we map keywords in DB to the values in the range [0,m−1] for range queries 6 , where m is the maximum number of values. If we want to search the range [0,3], a naïve solution is to send every value in the range (0, 1, 2 and 3) to the server, which is not efficient. To reduce the number of keywords sent to the server, we use the binary tree as shown in Fig. 1.(a) . For the range query [0,3], we simply send the keyword n 3 (the minimum nodes to cover value 0, 1, 2 and 3) to the server. In BDB, every node in the binary tree is the keyword of the binary database, and every node has all the file indices for its decedents, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
(d).
As shown in Fig. 1.(a) , keyword in BDB corresponding to node i (the black integer) is n i (e.g. the keyword for node 0 is n 0 .). The blue integers are the keywords in DB and are mapped to the values in the range [0, 3] . These values are associated with the leaves of our binary tree. The words in red are the file indices in DB. For every node (keyword), it contains all the file indices in its descendant leaves. Node n 1 contains f 0 , f 1 , f 2 , f 3 and there is no file in node n 4 (See Fig.  1.(d) ). For a range query [0, 2], we need to send the keywords n 1 , n 4 (n 1 and n 4 are the minimum number of keywords to cover the range [0, 2].) to the server, and the result file indices are f 0 , f 1 , f 2 and f 3 .
Bit String Representation. We parse the file indices for every keyword in BDB (e.g. every column in Figure 1.(d) ) into a bit string, which we will use later. Suppose there are y − 1 documents in our BDB, then we need y bits to represent the existence of these documents. The highest bit is the sign bit (0 means positive and 1 means negative). If f i contains keyword n j , then the i-th bit of the bit string for n j (every keyword has a bit string) is set to 1. Otherwise, it is set to 0. For update, if we want to add a new file index f i (which also contains keyword n j ) to keyword n j , we need a positive bit string, where the i-th bit is set to 1 and all other bits are set to 0. Next, we add this bit string to the existing bit string associated with n j 7 . Then, f i is added to the bit string for n j . If we want to delete file index f i from the bit string for n j , we need a negative bit string (the most significant bit is set to 1), the i-th bit is set to 1 and the remaining bits are set to 0. Then, we need to get the complement of the bit string 8 . Next, we add the complement bit string as in the add operation. Finally, the f i is deleted from the bit string for n j .
For example, in Fig. 1.(b) , the bit string for n 0 is 000001, and the bit string for n 4 is 000000. Assume that we want to delete file index f 0 from n 0 and add it to n 4 . First we need to generate bit string 000001 and add it to the bit string (000000) for n 4 . Next we generate the complement bit string 111111 (the complement of 100001) and add it to 000001 for n 0 . Then, the result bit strings for n 0 and n 4 are 000000 and 000001, respectively. As a result, the file index f 0 has been moved from n 0 to n 4 . Note that, in the range queries, the bit strings are bit exclusive since a file is corresponded to one value only. 8 In a computer, the subtraction is achieved by adding the complement of the negative bit string.
Binary Tree Assignment and Update. As we use the binary tree to support data structure needed in our DSSE, we define the following operations that are necessary to manipulate the DSSE data structure. TCon(m): For an integer m, the operation builds a complete binary tree CBT.
CBT has log(m) + 1 levels, where the root is on the level 0, and the leaves are on the level log(m) . All leaves are associated with the m consecutive integers from left to right.
TAssign(CBT):
The operation takes a CBT as an input and outputs an assigned binary tree ABT, where nodes are labelled by appropriate integers. The operation applies TAssignSub recursively. Keywords then are assigned to the node integers. TAssignSub(c, CBT): For an input pair: a counter c and CBT, the operation outputs an assigned binary tree. It is implemented as a recursive function. It starts from 0 and assigns to nodes incrementally. See Fig. 2 for an example. TGetNodes(n, ABT): For an input pair: a node n and a tree ABT, the operation generates a collection of nodes in a path from the node n to the root node. This operation is needed for our update algorithm if a client wants to add a file to a leaf (a value in the range). The file is added to the leaf and its parent nodes. TUpdate(add, v, CBT): The operation takes a value v and a complete binary tree CBT and updates CBT so the tree contains the value v. For simplicity, we consider the current complete binary tree contains values in the range [0, v − 1] 9 . Depending on the value of v, the operation is executed according to the following cases:
-v = 0: It means that the current complete binary tree is null, we simply create a node and associate value v = 0 with the node. The operation returns the node as CBT. -v > 0: If the current complete binary tree is a perfect binary tree PBT or it consists of a single node only, we need to create a virtual binary tree VBT, which is a copy of the current binary tree. Next, we merge the virtual perfect binary tree with the original one getting a large perfect binary tree. Finally, we need to associate the value v with the least virtual leaf (the leftmost virtual leaf without a value) of the virtual binary tree and set this leaf and its parents as real. For example, in Fig. 2.(a) , v = 4, the nodes with solid line are real and the nodes with dot line are virtual which can be added later. Otherwise, we directly associate the value v to the least virtual leaf and set this leaf and its parents as real 10 . In Fig. 2.(b) , v = 5.
Note that, in our range queries, we need to parse a normal database DB to its binary form BDB. First, we need to map keywords of DB to integers in the range [0, |W | − 1], where |W | is the total number of keywords in DB. Next, we construct a binary tree as described above. The keywords are assigned to the nodes of the binary tree and are associated with the documents of their descendants. For Associate value v = 0 to this node.
4:
Set CBT to this node. 5: else if CBT is PBT or CBT has one node then 6:
Create a new root node rootn.
7:
Create a VBT = CBT 8:
CBT.parent=VBT.parent=rootn 9:
CBT = rootn 10:
Associate v to the least virtual leaf and set this leaf and its parents as real. Fig. 1 .a, the keywords are {n 0 , n 1 , · · · , n 6 } and BDB(n 0 ) = {f 0 }, BDB(n 1 ) = {f 0 , f 1 , f 2 , f 3 }.
DSSE Range Queries -Construction A
In this section, we apply our new binary tree to the Bost [5] scheme to support range queries. For performing a ranger query, the client in our scheme first determine a collection of keywords to cover the requested range. Then, she generates the search token corresponding to each node (in the cover) and sends them to the sever, which can be done in a similar way as [5] . Now we are ready to present the first DSSE scheme that supports range queries and is forward-private. The scheme is described in Algorithm 2, where F is a cryptographically strong pseudorandom function (PRF), H 1 and H 2 are keyed hash functions and Π is a trapdoor permutation. Setup(1 λ ): For a security parameter 1 λ , the algorithm outputs (TPK, TSK, K, T, N, m), where TPK and TSK are the public key and secret keys of the trapdoor permutation, respectively, K is the secret key of function F , T, N are maps and m is the maximum number of the values in our range queries. The map N is used to store the pair keyword/(ST c , c) (current search token and the counter c, please see Algorithm 2 for more details.) and is kept by the client. The map T is the encrypted database EDB that used to store the encrypted indices which is kept by the server. -v < m: The client simply adds ind to the leaf, which contains value v and its parents (See line 9-24 in Algorithm 2). This is a basic update, which is similar to the one from [5] .
The client first updates the complete binary tree to which she adds the value v. If a new root is added to the new complete binary tree, then the server needs to add all file indices of the old complete binary tree to the new one. Finally, the server needs to add ind to the leaf, which contains value v and its parents. if CBT added a new root then 6:
Get the leaf nv of value v.
10:
ABT ← TAssign(CBT) 11:
NSet ← TGetNodes(nv, ABT) 12:
for every node n ∈ NSet do 13:
e ← ind ⊕ H2(Kn, STc+1) 23:
Send (U Tc+1, e) to the Server.
24:
end for 25: else if v < m then 26:
Execute line 9-24. 27: end if Server: Input (U Tc+1, e), EDB Output EDB 28: Upon receiving (U Tc+1, e) 29:
The DSSE supports range queries at the cost of large client storage, since the number of search tokens is linear in the number of all nodes of the current tree instead of only leaves. In [5] , the number of entries at the client is |W |, while it would be roughly 2|W | in this construction. Moreover, the communication cost is heavy since the server needs to return all file indices to the client for every search. To overcome the weakness, we give a new construction with lower client storage and communication cost in the following section.
DSSE Range Queries -Construction B
In this section, we give the second construction by leveraging the Paillier cryptosystem [17] and bit string representation, which significantly reduce the client storage and communication cost compared with the first one at the cost of losing forward privacy. With the the homomorphic addition property of the Paillier cryptosystem, we can add and delete the file indices by parsing them into binary strings, as illustrated in Section 4.2. Next we briefly describe our second DSSE, which can not only support range queries but also achieve backward privacy. The scheme is described in Algorithm 3. Setup(1 λ ): For a security parameter 1 λ , the algorithm returns (PK, SK, K, T, m), where PK and SK are the public and secret keys of the Paillier cryptosystem, respectively, K is the secret key of a PRF F , m is the maximum number of values which can be used to reconstruct the binary tree and the encrypted database EDB is stored in a map T which is kept by the server.
The protocol is executed between a client and a server. The client queries for documents, whose keywords are in the range [a, b] , where 0 ≤ a ≤ b < m. σ is the state of EDB, and integer m specifies the maximum values for our range queries. The server returns encrypted file indices e to the client, who can decrypt e by using the secret key SK of Pailler Cryptosystem and obtain the file indices of requested documents. Update(op, v, ind, σ, m, EDB): The protocol runs between a client and a server. A requested update is named by the parameter op. The integer v and the file index ind specifies the tree nodes that need to be updated. The current state σ, the integer m and the server with input EDB. If op = add, the client generates a bit string as prescribed in Section 4.2. In case when op = delete, the client creates the complement bit string as given in Section 4.2. The bit string bs is encrypted using the Paillier cryptosystem. The encrypted string is denoted by e. There are following three cases: -v < m: The client sends the encrypted bit string e with the leaf n v containing value v and its parents to server. Next the server adds e with the existing encrypted bit strings corresponding to the nodes specified by the client. See line 11-23 in Algorithm 3 which is similar to the update in Algorithm 2. -v = m: The client first updates the complete binary tree to which she adds the value v. If a new root is added to the new complete binary tree, then the client retrieves the encrypted bit string of the root (before update). Next the client adds it to the new root by sending it with the new root to the server. Finally, the client adds e to the leaf that contains value v and its parents as in v < m case. -v > m: The client uses Update as many times as needed. For simplicity, we only consider v = m, where m is the number of values in the maximum range.
In this construction, it achieves backward privacy. Moreover, the communication overhead between the client and the server is significantly reduced due to the fact that for each query, the server returns a single ciphertext to the client at the
Send U Tn to the server. U T rooto ← FK (rooto) 7:
U T rootn ← FK (rootn) 8:
T[U T rootn ] ← e 10:
end if 11:
12:
ABT ← TAssign(CBT) 13:
NSet ← TGetNodes(nv, ABT) 14:
if op = add then 15:
Generate cost of supporting small number of documents. Since, in Paillier cryptosystem, the length of the message is usually small and fixed (e.g. 1024 bits).
This construction can be applied to applications, where the number of documents is small and simultaneously the number of keywords can be large. The reason for this is the fact that for a given keyword, the number of documents which contain it is small. Consider a temperature forecast system that uses a database, which stores records from different sensors (IoT) located in different cities across Australia. In the application, the cities (sensors) can be considered as documents and temperature measurements can be considered as the keywords. For example, Sydney and Melbourne have the temperature of 18
• C. Adelaide and Wollongong have got 17
• C and 15
• C, respectively. If we query for cities, whose temperature measurements are in the range from 17 to 18
• C, then the outcome includes Adelaide, Sydney and Melbourne. Here, the number of cities (documents) is not large. The number of different temperature measurements (keywords) can be large depending on requested precision.
Security Analysis
Similar to [13] , for a range query q = [a, b], let {n c1 , ..., n ct } be the tree cover of interval [a, b] . We consider n ci as a keyword and parse a range query into several keywords. Before define the leakage functions, we define a search query q = (t, [a, b]) = {(t, n c1 ), · · · , (t, n ct )}. For an update query, if we want to update a file ind with value v, we may need to update the corresponding leaf node and its parents in the tree denoted as {n u1 , · · · , n ut }. We define an update query u = (t, op, (v, ind)) = {(t, op, (n u1 , ind)), · · · , (t, op, (n ut , ind))}. For a list of search query Q = {(t, n) : (t, n) ∈ {q}} and a list of update query Q = {(t, op, (n, ind)) : (t, op, (n, ind)) ∈ {u}} Then, following [5] , the leakage to the server is summarized as follows:
-Search pattern sp(n) = {t : (t, n) ∈ Q}, it leaks the timestamp t that the same search query on n. -History Hist(n) = {(t, op, ind) : (t, op, (n, ind)) ∈ Q }, the history of keyword n. It includes all the updates made to DB(n) and when the update happened. -contain pattern cp(n) = {t : DB(n) ⊆ DB(n ) and t < t, (t , n ), (t, n) ∈ Q}, it leaks the time t of previous search query on keyword n , where DB(n) ⊆ DB(n ). Note that, cp(n) is an inherited leakage for range queries when the file indices are revealed to the server. If a query n is a subrange of query n , then the file index set for n will also be a subset of the file index set for n .
Forward Privacy
Following [5] , forward privacy means that an update does not leak any information about keywords of updated documents matching a query we previously issued. A formal definition is given below:
A L-adaptively-secure DSSE scheme Γ is forward-private if the update leakage function L U pdt can be written as
where (ind i , µ i ) is the set of modified documents paired with number µ i of modified keywords for the updated document ind i .
Construction A
Since the first DSSE construction is based on [5] , it inherits security of the original design. Adaptive security of the construction A can be proven in the Random Oracle Model and is a modification of the security proof of [5] . We refer readers to Appendix for the full proof.
Compared with [5] , this construction additionally leaks the contain pattern cp as described in Section 3.1. Other leakages are exactly the same as [5] . Since the server executes one keyword search and update one keyword/file-index pair at a time. Note that the server does not know the secret key of the trapdoor permutation, so it cannot learn anything about the pair even if the keyword has been searched by the client previously.
Backward Privacy
Backward privacy means that a search query on keyword n does not leak the file indices that previously added and later deleted. More formally, we modify the Type I definition of [6] . It leaks keyword n has been updated 11 , the total number of updates on n. More formally, Definition 3. A L-adaptively-secure DSSE scheme Γ is backward-private if the the search and update leakage functions L Srch , L U pdt can be written as
Construction B
The adaptive security of second DSSE construction relies on the semantic security of Paillier cryptosystem. All file indices are encrypted using the public key of Paillier cryptosystem. Without the secret key, the server cannot learn anything from the ciphertext. Note that, during update, this construction leaks which keyword has been updated. We refer readers to Appendix for the full proof.
Theorem 2. (Adaptive backward privacy of B). Let
During the update, the construction B leaks which keyword has been updated. However, it does not leak the type of update (either add or del) on encrypted file indices, because both addition and deletion are achieved by homomorphic addition. Moreover, it does not leak contain pattern cp and the file indices that previously added and later deleted since the file indices have been encrypted, and the server can learn nothing without the secret key.
Conclusion
In this paper, we give two secure DSSE schemes that support range queries. The first DSSE construction applies our binary tree to Bost [5] 's framework which achieves forward privacy. However, it incurs a large storage overhead in the client and a large communication cost between the client and the server. To achieve backward privacy, we propose the second DSSE construction with range queries by applying Paillier cryptosystem and bit string representation. In this construction, we use the fixed update token to reduce the client and the server storage at the cost of losing forward privacy. In addition, it can not support large number of documents. Although the second DSSE construction cannot support large number of documents, it can still be very useful in certain applications. In the future, we would like to construct more scalable DSSE schemes with more expressive queries.
Note that, we can consider B 2 = B 3 without loss of generality.
Game G 1,4 : In G 1,4 , we keep the records of the random generated encrypted strings of the H 1 and H 2 . In Update, we choose random values for update tokens and ciphertexts in Table UT Get the c-th search token STc of previously queried keyword at time t . 6: else 7:
Parse Hist(n) as ((t0, add, ind0), · · · , (tc, add, indc)) 8:
if Hist(n) =⊥ then 9:
return ∅ 10: end if 11:
for i = 0 to c do Simulator S 1 With the contain pattern cp, the simulator can reuse the certain update token U T to simulate the inclusion relationship between the keywords. We can use the search patternn ← min sp(n) and history Hist to simulate the Search and Update. Similar to [5] , we have Game G 2,1 : Instead of calling F when generating U T n , G 2,1 picks a new random key when it inputs a new keyword n, and stores it in a (1 λ ).
Algorithm 6 Simulator S 2 S.Setup(1 λ )
1: (SK, PK) ← KeyGen(1 λ ) 2: return (PK, SK, t) S.Update(n) Client:
1: U Tn ← Key(n)
2: e ← Enc(PK, 0 · · · 0) 3: Send (U Tn, e) to the server. S.Search(sp(n)) Client: 1:n ← min sp(n) 2: U Tn ← Key(n) 3: Send U Tn to the server.
Simulator Now, we can simulator the DSSEIDEAL with the leakage functions defined in this Theorem. We removed the useless part which will not influence the client's transcript. See Algorithm 6 for more details. This two games is indistinguishable. So we have (1 λ ) which completes the proof.
